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JURISDICTION 
This Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because 
Plain "Plaintiff") failed to timely fi I.-- v.^ ti. .-.•: \ i Vc, ; id the 
Notice of Appeal _ u timely filed, this Court would have had appellate 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to IItah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 as a case 
transferred ft oi i i the \ Itah Si lprei i le Coui t. I he Supi ei lie C0111 1: would ha ve 1 lad 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), and would 
have had authority to transfer this matter to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal in light of 
Plaintiffs failure to timely file its Notice of Appeal. 
2. Whether pi: u agraph i 1 of the Termination Agreement is 
unambiguous. 
3. Whether, in order for a "sale" to have occurred within the meaning 
of the plain language of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement (line had to 
be a transfer of the Center that satisfied each of the following conditions: 
1. There had to be a transfer of the Center, wherein the 
purchaser acquired and paid consideration for a]1 of the following: 
a. The Center's lease on the leased premises, 
b. Ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center", 
1 
c. All of the Equipment and other assets located at 
the Center, and 
d. The Center's patients and accounts receivable, 
2. The purchaser had to assume complete operational 
control of the Center, and 
3. The purchaser had to continue operating under the same 
name at the same location. 
4. Whether Plaintiff failed to establish that a "sale" within the plain 
meaning of paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement occurred. 
5. Whether the trial court was correct in denying the Plaintiff s Counter-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This issue poses a question of law, to which a non-
deferential correction of error standard applies. 
As to the first issue, on whether summary disposition is appropriate on the 
jurisdiction issue, a question of law is presented that the trial court had no 
opportunity to review. This Court has yet to decide the issue, since the Supreme 
Court reserved on it. In reviewing whether the trial court properly granted 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court should review the facts in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, while giving no particular defereace to the 
trial court's view of the case. See Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift 
& Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990). 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants and Plaintiff formerly worked together in providing medical and 
physical therapy services at the Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center located at 670 
East, ' • • ,.Ve Citv Utah (the "Cent* * ") Oi ,. I lay 22, 1 989, 
Plaintiff and Defendants entereu nuu uie Termination Agreement and Piitchase 
Agreement ("Termination Agreement") memorializing the terms of the 
termination of their prior relationship. Included at paragraph 11 of the 
Tern lii latioi i \greei i lei it is the fol lowing provisioi I: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two (2) 
years from the date of this Agreement, [Defendants] 
sell the Center to any third party, [Plaintiff] will be 
entitled to one-third (1/3) of that portion of the 
purchase price which is attributed to good will. "Sale" 
shall be defined as a transfer wherein the purchaser 
acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: 
The Center's lease on the Leased Premises, ownership 
of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center," all of 
the equipment and other assets located at the Center, 
the Center's patients and accounts receivable, and 
whereby the purchaser assumes complete operational 
lA copy of each rule is attached hereto at Addendum L 
control of the business of the Center and continues 
operating under the same name at the same location. 
(Termination Agreement at K 11, R. 12-13; emphasis added.) 
On May 24, 1990, Defendants entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement 
with IHC Hospitals, Inc. ("BHC") whereby Defendants sold to IHC an undivided 
one-half interest in the Center.2 (See ^ 1(a) of Asset Purchase Agreement.)3 
Defendants and IHC each then contributed their undivided one-half interests in the 
Center in forming a joint venture called "Sports Medicine West" (the "Joint 
Venture"). (See ^ 2.1 of Joint Venture Agreement submitted for in camera 
review.) After the Joint Venture was formed, the Joint Venture conducted its 
business operations for a time at the location where the Center had previously been 
located. However, the Joint Venture did not continue to use the name "Salt Lake 
Sports Medicine Center." The Joint Venture changed the name on the door of the 
operation, the marquis in the lobby, and on two monument signs located on the 
building's exterior more than one year before Plaintiff filed the Complaint. 
(Affidavit of Gene Oaks at \ 5, R.272-73.) Furthermore, Defendants continued 
to have operational control of the Center after the Joint Venture was created. (See 
2Pursuant to the Asset Purchase Agreement, Defendants also sold to IHC an undivided one-
half interest in other centers also owned by Defendants. 
3The Asset Purchase Agreement was submitted to the trial court for in camera review 
pursuant to a Stipulated Protective Order entered by the court. The documents submitted for in 
camera review remain sealed on appeal so precise citations to the record are not available. 
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Article 4 of Joint Venture Agreement and Management Agreement submitted for 
in camera review.) 
On October 4, 1991, Plaintiff filed its Complaint for Declaratory Relief (the 
"Complaint"). The Complaint alleged that a "sale" within the meaning of 
paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement occurred when defendant Salt Lake 
Knee & Sports Medicine ("Medicine") entered into the Asset Purchase Agreement 
with IHC on May 24, 1990. (Complaint at \ 8, R. 4.) 
On June 15, 1993, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
By that motion, Defendants asserted that no sale within the plain language of 
paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement had occurred, and challenged Plaintiff 
to come forward with evidence of such a sale. (Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 171-196.) 
On August 10, 1993, Plaintiff filed its Counter-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment.4 Significantly, Plaintiff did not then assert that paragraph 11 of the 
Termination Agreement was ambiguous. To the contrary, the Plaintiff asserted 
that paragraph 11 was not ambiguous, and that Plaintiff was entitled to summary 
judgment, claiming Defendants' transaction with IHC, when considered in total, 
^Plaintiff's counter-motion was framed as a counter-motion for partial summary judgment 
because although Plaintiff sought a determination that Defendants' transaction with IHC 
constituted a "sale", Plaintiff was not at that time seeking a determination as to damages. Thus, 
Plaintiff conceded the absence of factual issues on liability questions. 
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constituted a "sale" under paragraph 11. Plaintiffs supporting memorandum 
states: 
Paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement 
goes on to define a "sale" for purposes of the 
agreement and requires that a purchaser acquire and 
pay consideration for all of an enumerated list of assets 
including the lease, the name Salt Lake Sports 
Medicine Center", the equipment and other assets of 
the Center, patients, and accounts receivable. It also 
requires a purchaser to assume complete operational 
control of the business of the Center at the same 
location. 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Support of the Plaintiffs Counter-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at pp. 
10-11, R. 210-11.) On September 8, 1993, Defendants moved to strike the 
inadmissible portions of the two affidavits filed by Plaintiff and opposed Plaintiffs 
counter-motion for summary judgment by filing three affidavits. (R. 258-89.) 
On September 24, 1993, the trial court heard argument on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and on Plaintiff's Counter-Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. Neither Defendants' counsel nor Plaintiffs counsel argued 
that paragraph 11 was ambiguous. Plaintiff asserted that the transaction between 
Defendants and IHC constituted a "sale" under paragraph 11. Defendants argued 
that it did not. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Wilkinson raised a 
question about the meaning of paragraph 11. He said: 
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Let me indicate this to you, maybe I'm the one 
who's out in left field, but I'm the one, as I read this 
contract, who had as my immediate interpretation of 
the contract that it was different than what both of you 
are arguing. That's what concerns me. 
When I read the term "all," that's why I have 
asked you: It says that the sale shall be defined as the 
transfer of or the purchaser acquiring and paying 
consideration for all of the following. That does not 
include 100 percent of the value of the following, but 
it must include in the sale all of the following items, 
and each one of those items were sold. There was not 
100 percent, but there was 50 percent; but all of those 
were sold. 
It says that the sale shall be defined as a transfer 
when the purchaser acquires and pays consideration for 
all of the following. And to me, I didn't even think of 
this " 100 percent;" it was just the sale must include all 
of the following. 
(R. 480-81.)5 
At the suggestion of Defendants' counsel, the trial court allowed the parties 
to submit additional written briefing with respect to the meaning of paragraph 11. 
On October 4, 1993, Defendants submitted their supplemental memorandum 
demonstrating that paragraph 11 was not ambiguous. (R. 304-315). 
On October 14, 1993, Plaintiff submitted its supplemental memorandum. 
Once again, Plaintiff argued that the transaction between Defendants and IHC 
5After the trial court made this suggestion, counsel for Plaintiff conveniently agreed that the 
language could be interpreted as the court had suggested. (R. 481.) It is clear that Plaintiff's 
counsel did so not because the trial court's initial interpretation conformed to Plaintiff's 
understanding and intent, but rather, because Plaintiff would prevail if the trial court followed 
its initial "out in left field" interpretation. 
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constituted a "sale" as that term is defined in paragraph 11. Plaintiff also 
suggested, for the first time, that paragraph 11 was ambiguous. Plaintiff failed, 
however, to come forward with any evidence that when the Termination 
Agreement was entered into Plaintiff understood or intended for paragraph 11 to 
have the meaning suggested by the trial court. (R. 330-338.) 
On November 15, 1993, the trial court heard additional oral argument on 
the motions. In his argument, counsel for Plaintiff took the position that the 
language of paragraph 11 was unambiguous6, that there were no disputed issues 
of fact, and that Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment. (R. 492.) 
The trial court, after receiving the additional memoranda and considering 
the oral arguments of counsel, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
from the bench. In making this ruling, the trial court, with respect to paragraph 
11, stated: 
As I indicated to you, as I read it, when I read 
that, I read it as "all of the following parts of it must 
be included;" and at the time I read it, and of course 
now it's been argued before the court — which I noted 
— that the drafter of the agreement first said "all of the 
following" and then in the following he put two other 
phrases which included "all," where he says, "all 
equipment and other assets," and, "complete 
operational control." 
6Although Plaintiff's counsel took the position that paragraph 11 is unambiguous, he did not 
adopt the interpretation advanced from the beginning by Defendants. Instead, he adopted the 
trial court's earlier interpretation, suggesting that the plain language of paragraph 11 had the 
meaning initially ascribed by the trial court. (R. 492.) 
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So my interpretation of the way I read that is 
that the sale must include ail of the following, all of 
the following items. And from those items, it must be 
all of the equipment and assets, and they must have 
complete operational control. 
(R. 494.) 
Furthermore, the trial court accepted Plaintiff's invitation to consider the 
entire transaction between Defendants and IHC, but concluded that even 
considering the Plaintiffs joint venture argument, a "sale" within the meaning of 
paragraph 11 did not occur, and thus summary judgment was appropriate. (R. 
494-95.) 
On November 29, 1993, before the trial court entered its order granting 
summary judgment, Plaintiff filed a document entitled Motion for Reconsideration 
(the "Motion for Reconsideration"). This motion set forth no new arguments or 
facts, nor did Plaintiff ask the trial court to amend or alter its judgment7. 
Importantly, Plaintiff also asked the trial court to not enter the proposed summary 
judgment order. (Motion for Reconsideration at p. 3, R. 353.) 
On December 6, 1993, after the Motion for Reconsideration was filed, and 
rejecting Plaintiffs request to not enter the Order of Summary Judgment, the trial 
defendants note here that in its supporting memorandum, Plaintiff asked the trial court to 
vacate the summary judgment if, after clarifying the basis for its ruling, the court was somehow 
persuaded that its ruling was incorrect. This relief was not sought in the motion, and in any 
event does not arise to a request for a "new trial.". 
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court entered its order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. (R. 358.) 
Nearly two months after the entry of the order of summary judgment on 
January 28, 1994, the trial court held a hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration 
and, without hearing any argument, offered no new explanation for its original 
ruling. (R. 498-505.) On March 16, 1994, over three months after the trial court 
entered its Order of Summary Judgment, the trial court entered its Order 
effectively affirming its grant of summary judgment. (R. 414.) 
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on April 11, 1994, 126 days after the 
entry of summary judgment. (R. 417.) On May 25, 1994, Defendants filed their 
Motion for Summary Disposition of Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal with the Utah 
Supreme Court on the ground that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction due to 
Plaintiffs untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal. 
On June 15, 1994, the Supreme Court reserved ruling on the Motion for 
Summary Disposition pursuant to Rule 10(f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
On July 14, 1994, this case was poured-over to this Court by the Supreme Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court does not have jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiff failed 
to file its Notice of Appeal in a timely manner. Accordingly, this Court should 
dismiss the appeal without reaching the merits of Plaintiff s substantive arguments. 
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If this Court reaches the merits of Plaintiffs appeal, it should consider 
Plaintiff's three substantive arguments on appeal. First, Plaintiff asserts that the 
trial court erred in not granting Plaintiffs Counter-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment because the transaction between Defendants and IHC constituted a "sale" 
within the meaning of the plain language of paragraph 11 of the Termination 
Agreement. Defendants agree with Plaintiff that the language of paragraph 11 is 
plain and unambiguous, that there are no disputed material facts, and that the trial 
court had no choice except to enter summary judgment in favor of either 
Defendants or Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff failed to establish that a "sale" within 
the meaning of paragraph 11 occurred because the undisputed evidence establishes: 
(1) that a purchaser did not acquire and pay consideration for ah of the equipment 
and assets of the Center; (2) that a purchaser did not acquire complete operational 
control of the Center; and (3) that the Center did not continue to operate at the 
same location under the same name. To properly oppose Defendants' motion, 
Plaintiff was required to come forward with record evidence establishing that each 
of these requirements were fulfilled. In order to establish that a "sale" within the 
meaning of paragraph 11 occurred, it was Plaintiffs burden to make such a 
showing. It did not, and as a result of Plaintiffs failure to come forward with 
record evidence supporting these elements, the trial court properly granted 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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In complete contradiction of its first argument, Plaintiff also suggests that 
paragraph 11 is ambiguous, and that there were material disputed facts that should 
have precluded the trial court from entering summary judgment. This Court 
should reject that argument, because paragraph 11 is unambiguous. 
The trial court was correct to grant Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and Defendants respectfully request that this Court affirm the order of 
the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION AND SHOULD DISMISS THE 
APPEAL. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY 
FILED. 
This Court should dismiss Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that, "it is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that failure 
to timely perfect an appeal is a jurisdictional failure requiring dismissal of the 
appeal." Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 
(Utah 1984). Accordingly, because Plaintiff failed to file its Notice of Appeal in 
a timely manner, this Court should dismiss the appeal. 
Rule 4(a), Ut. R. App. P., unequivocally provides that a notice of appeal 
must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
The Summary Judgment Order was entered by the trial court on December 6, 
1993. Accordingly, Plaintiff was required to file the Notice of Appeal on or 
12 
before January 5, 1994. The Notice of Appeal, however, was not filed until April 
11, 1994 - more than 120 days after the Order was entered. Because Plaintiffs 
Notice of Appeal is untimely, this Court has no jurisdiction, and should dismiss 
the appeal as a matter of law. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT 
EXTEND THE TIME UNDER RULE 4. 
Plaintiff is aware of its jurisdictional defect, and has attempted to 
circumvent it by lately arguing that the Motion for Reconsideration "despite its 
title, was a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure." Docketing Statement at pp. 1-2. This self-serving characterization 
of the Motion for Reconsideration is entirely inconsistent with the language of the 
document itself. In the Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff "request[ed] 
reconsideration by the [trial court] of its statements made in both hearings and a 
clarification of the basis for the [trial court's] ruling." (Motion for 
Reconsideration at p. 3, R. 353.) Plaintiff did not ask the trial court to grant a new 
trial, and Plaintiff did not come forward with any new legal or factual matters. 
Instead, Plaintiff merely requested that the trial court reconsider the statements 
made at both hearings and only asked the trial court to clarify the basis for its 
ruling. This relief (to the extent it is relief) is not contemplated by Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it was not a motion for new trial as 
Plaintiff now claims, and did not toll the running of Plaintiffs time to appeal. 
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1. Utah Rules Do Not Provide For Reconsideration. 
Notably, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not contemplate or provide 
for motions for reconsideration. The Utah Supreme Court has noted the absence 
of an express provision numerous times. See, e.g., Ute-Cal Land Development 
v. Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d 1278, 1280 n. 7 (Utah 1981) (Motion 
to cure inconsistent rulings held distinguishable from "Motion to Reconsider", 
which "essentially asked the court to rethink its decision."); Tracy v. University 
of Utah Hospital 619 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1980) ("In any event, our rules of 
procedure make no provision for such a motion as that of 'reconsideration.'"); 
Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 842 (Utah 1980) ("When [a motion has been made] 
and the court has ruled upon the motion, if the party ruled against were permitted 
to go beyond the rules, make a motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge 
to reverse himself, the question arises, why should not the other party who is now 
ruled against be permitted to make a motion for re-re-consideration, asking the 
court to again reverse itself?" (quoting Drury v. Lunceford, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah 
1966)). The policy reasons behind this rule are obvious, the ignoring of which 
would burden the courts' dockets and prolong litigation beyond all reason. 
However, Defendants recognize that courts have embraced a sort of common law 
concept of reconsideration. But that concept takes many forms, not all of which 
arise to the level of "new trial." 
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2. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration Was Not Equivalent To 
A Motion for New Trial. 
Defendants acknowledge that some authority in this jurisdiction exists for 
the proposition that a motion for reconsideration can be deemed a motion for new 
trial. See, e ^ , Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that the motion for reconsideration was 
actually a motion for new trial. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the time 
for filing the notice of appeal was 30 days from the entry of the order denying the 
motion for new trial. But Watkiss does not stand for the proposition that all 
reconsideration motions are equivalent to motions for new trials. Two critical 
facts distinguish the present facts from the Watkiss case, and mandate dismissal 
of this appeal. First, the trial court's treatment of the motion is dispositive. In 
Watkiss, this Court observed: 
Under the facts of this case, the incorrect title placed 
upon the pleading was not a bar to defendant's case. 
Indeed, the record reflects that the judge ruled on the 
motion as if it were a motion for a new trial. Because 
the court treated the motion to reconsider as a motion 
for a new trial we conclude that the filing of the 
motion tolled the time in which to file an appeal. 
Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, supra, at 1064-1065 (emphasis added). 
Thus, how the lower court treated the motion is determinative on the issue of 
tolling. Here, the trial court did not allow further oral argument and merely 
15 
permitted its summary judgment order to stand without further clarification. Thus, 
the trial court did not treat the motion as one for a new trial. 
The second distinguishing fact here is the trial court's entry of the summary 
judgment order notwithstanding Plaintiffs request that it not do so. Implicit in 
Plaintiffs request here was Plaintiffs fear that the time to appeal would commence 
upon entry of the order. And if the trial court truly considered Plaintiffs motion 
as one for a new trial, it had no reason to enter the order. Yet the trial court 
entered the order notwithstanding the pending Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, 
and particularly in light of the trial court's summary treatment of the Motion for 
Reconsideration, this Court should conclude the trial court did not treat Plaintiffs 
Motion as one for a new trial under Rule 59. 
The basis for the trial court's decision to allow the summary judgment order 
to stand, and for its determination to not clarify the order further, was made clear 
at the conclusion of the hearing. In response to Plaintiffs counsel's statement, 
"[Tjhen, you know, what my clients are stuck with is simply a bad contract," the 
trial court stated, "That's right." (R. 503-04.) Thus, this Court should dismiss 
this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 11 OF 
THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE 
PLAIN, UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF PARAGRAPH 11 
The dispute in this case has always been simple. Plaintiff has always 
claimed that Defendants' initial transfer of an undivided one-half interest in the 
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Center to IHC, together with Defendants' and IHC's subsequent contributions of 
both undivided one-half interests in the Center in the form of the Joint Venture 
constituted a "sale" under paragraph 11 of the Termination Agreement. Yet a 
"sale" did not occur for four simple reasons: First, Defendants' sale to IHC of an 
undivided one-half interest in the Center did not constitute a sale of "all of the 
equipment and other assets located at the Center" as required by paragraph 11. 
Second, Defendants' subsequent combination of their remaining undivided one-half 
interest in the Center into the Joint Venture (even when considered together with 
the prior transfer to IHC) did not constitute a sale "wherein the purchaser 
[acquired] and [paid] consideration for . . . all of the equipment and other assets 
located at the Center." Third, a purchaser never assumed complete operational 
control of the business of the Center as required by paragraph 11. And, Fourth, 
the Joint Venture did not continue operating the Center under the same name. 
Significantly, each party initially took the position that paragraph 11 is 
unambiguous and that each party is entitled to summary judgment when the 
transaction between Defendants and IHC is measured against the requirements of 
paragraph 11. Although Plaintiff suggests in its brief that paragraph 11 is 
ambiguous (based on the trial court's initial reaction to paragraph 11, which the 
trial court admitted may be "out in left field" (R. 480.)), Plaintiff asks this Court, 
on appeal, to reverse the trial court and to "grant [Plaintiff's] Motion for Summary 
Judgment." (Appellant's Brief at pp. 32-33.) 
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Plaintiff cannot have it both ways. Paragraph 11 is either unambiguous, in 
which case the only issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff met its burden of 
coming forward with evidence that the transaction between Defendants and IHC 
met each of the conditions of paragraph 11 or, paragraph 11 is ambiguous, the 
meaning ascribed to it by the trial court is inconsistent with the Plaintiffs 
understanding8, and the case must be remanded to the trial court for further 
action. 
A. PARAGRAPH 11 IS UNAMBIGUOUS 
Paragraph 11 reads: 
Purchase of Center. It is agreed that if within two (2) 
years from the date of this Agreement, [Defendants] 
sell the Center to any third party, [Plaintiff] will be 
entitled to one-third (1/3) of that portion of the 
purchase price which is attributed to good will. "Sale" 
shall be defined as a transfer wherein the purchaser 
acquires and pays consideration for all of the 
following: 
The Center's lease on the Leased Premises, ownership 
of the name "Slat Lake Sports Medicine Center," all of 
the equipment and other assets located at the Center, 
the Center's patients and accounts receivable, and 
whereby the purchaser assumes complete operational 
control of the business of the Center and continues 
operating under the same name at the same location. 
(Termination Agreement at ^ 11, R. 12-13; emphasis added.) 
Ht is important for this Court to note that Plaintiff produced no evidence that the trial court's 
final interpretation of paragraph 11 was inconsistent with what Plaintiff understood paragraph 
11 to mean. 
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Under the plain language of paragraph 11, three conditions precedent had 
to be satisfied in order for Defendants to owe Plaintiff money from the sale of the 
Center and its assets. 
1. There had to be a transfer of the Center, wherein the 
purchaser acquired and paid consideration for all of the following: 
a. The Center's lease on the leased premises, 
b. Ownership of the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine 
Center, 
c. All of the Equipment and other assets located at the 
Center, and 
d. The Center's patients and accounts receivable, 
2. The purchaser had to assume complete operational control of 
the Center, and 
3. The purchaser had to continue operating under the same name 
at the same location. 
None of these conditions were met, and no record evidence even tending to 
support them exists. 
Utah law on contract interpretation is clear. In Sparrow v. Tayco 
Construction Co., 846 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Utah App. 1993), this Court held that a 
contract that creates two or more plausible meanings is "ambiguous" as a matter 
of law. The Court also held, however, that a party's assertion of a different 
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meaning does not, in itself, render a contract "ambiguous." Furthermore, in 
Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 132 (Utah App. 1989), this Court held: 
[Ejxpress contract provisions are not rendered 
ambiguous merely because [a party] claims they should 
be interpreted other than according to their plain 
meaning. 
What a contract means, and whether it is ambiguous, is determined by first 
looking to the actual express words of the contract. The primacy of the contract 
language itself is emphasized by the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) ([A court 
may not] make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves," 
nor may it "enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the contract itself.") 
In this case, before the trial court identified its initial reaction, the parties 
never disagreed as to the clarity of paragraph 11. Since then, although fervently 
arguing to the trial court and to this Court that Plaintiff is entitled to summary 
judgment because paragraph 11 is unambiguous, Plaintiff has also half-heartedly 
suggested that the trial court's initial reaction to paragraph 11 means that 
paragraph 11 is ambiguous. 
In order for language to be ambiguous it must be susceptible to two or more 
interpretations plausible under the circumstances. The critical language of 
paragraph 11 is not susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation. 
Paragraph 11 states that for a "sale" to occur there must be a "transfer wherein the 
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purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all" of certain assets. (Emphasis 
added.) The trial court's initial reaction to the word "all" in this sentence was that 
it referred to each of the items that followed, but that it did not require that 100% 
of each item be sold so long as at least a portion of each item was sold. (R. 480.) 
The trial court's initial reaction failed to take into account the remainder of 
paragraph 11 that reads, in part, "all of the equipment and other assets located at 
the Center . . ., and whereby the purchaser assumes complete operational control 
of the business of the Center . . . ." After receiving the parties' supplemental 
memoranda and hearing counsels' arguments, the trial court focused more clearly 
on the critical language. The trial court ultimately and correctly concluded: 
So my interpretation of the way I read that is 
that the sale must include all of the following, all of 
the following items. And from those items, it must be 
all of the equipment and other assets, and they must 
have complete operational control. 
(R. 494.) The trial court's final interpretation of paragraph 11 is the only 
plausible interpretation of the plain language. When paragraph 11 requires the sale 
of "ah of the equipment and other assets located at the Center," the word "all" 
cannot be read to mean less than 100%. Furthermore, when paragraph 11 requires 
a purchaser to assume "complete" operational control," the word "complete" 
cannot be read to mean less than 100%. This Court should reject Plaintiffs 
suggestion that "all" and "complete" mean something less than 100%. Such an 
interpretation is not plausible. The trial court's "left field," initial reaction was 
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wholly inconsistent with the plain language of paragraph 11, and the trial court's 
ultimate rejection of that now should be affirmed. And, as set forth below, 
because Plaintiff failed to come forward with record evidence supporting each of 
the elements of its case, this Court should affirm the grant of summary judgment. 
HI. PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PRODUCE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING 
THAT DEFENDANTS' TRANSACTION WITH IHC SATISFIED 
EACH OF THE CONDITIONS PRECEDENT OF PARAGRAPH 11. 
In moving for summary judgment, Defendants pointed out to the trial court 
the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Rather than come forward at 
that time with record evidence in support of its claims, Plaintiff filed a counter 
motion for summary judgment, agreeing with Defendants that there were no issues 
of material fact. In any event, Plaintiff failed to come forward with record 
evidence in support of its claims, now, that there are factual issues. This burden 
must be met, and is required under this Court's decisions of Robinson v. 
Intermountain Health, Inc.. 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987), and Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988), citing to CelotexCorp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). One of the fundamental tenets in Celotex is that 
when the moving party points out to the court that there is no evidence in support 
of an element essential to the non-moving party's claims, the burden shifts to the 
non-moving party to come forward with record evidence in support of that 
essential element. 477 U.S. at 325. 
a 
Plaintiff has not attempted to argue that Defendants' sale of an undivided 
one-half interest in the Center constitutes a "sale" under paragraph 11. It is clear 
that such a sale does not qualify under paragraph 11. Instead, Plaintiff has argued 
to the trial court and to this Court on appeal that the sale to IHC and the creation 
of the Joint Venture thereafter, when looked at together, qualify as a sale under 
paragraph l l . 9 However, Plaintiffs argument as to the Joint Venture fails to take 
into account the definition of a "joint venture." Section 48-1-3.1(1), Utah Code 
Ann., reads: 
A joint venture is an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business 
enterprise, (emphasis added.) 
One cannot sell "all" of something and yet remain a "co-owner." As set forth 
below, the undisputed facts establish that the factual elements of a "sale" as 
defined by paragraph 11 did not occur and, as a result, it was correct for the trial 
court to grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
9Plaintiff suggests throughout its brief that the trial court considered only the Asset Purchase 
Agreement entered into by Defendants and IHC in reaching its conclusion. (Appellant's Brief 
at p. 22.) The record, however, shows that the opposite is true. When ruling from the bench, 
Judge Wilkinson spoke directly about Plaintiff's joint venture argument, stating: "I'm not 
persuaded by [Plaintiff's counsel's] argument as far as a joint venture is concerned. " (R. 494.) 
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A. A PURCHASER DID NOT ACQUIRE AND PAY 
CONSIDERATION FOR ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT AND 
OTHER ASSETS LOCATED AT THE CENTER. 
Plaintiff argues that the language of paragraph 11 requiring a purchaser to 
acquire and pay consideration for all of the equipment and other assets located at 
the Center was satisfied when Defendants sold an undivided one-half interest in the 
Center to IHC pursuant to the Purchase Agreement and then contributed the 
remaining undivided one-half interest to the Joint Venture. (Appellant's Brief at 
pp. 20-21.) Plaintiff fails, however, to recognize that the Joint Venture was not 
a sale whereby a purchaser acquired and paid consideration for all of the 
equipment and other assets of the Center. The Joint Venture was, as defined by 
Utah law, an association between Defendants and IHC to do business as the co-
owners of the Joint Venture. Accordingly, Defendants' contribution of their 
undivided one-half interest in the Center to the Joint Venture is not a transaction 
wherein a purchaser acquires and pays consideration for all of the equipment and 
other assets of the Center. 
B. A PURCHASER DID NOT ASSUME COMPLETE 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE BUSINESS OF THE 
CENTER. 
Plaintiff argues that the language of paragraph 11 requiring a purchaser to 
assume complete operational control of the business of the Center was satisfied 
because the Joint Venture assumed complete operational control of the Center. 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 21.) Alternatively, Plaintiff suggests that a disputed issue 
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of fact exists with respect to this issue. (Appellant's Brief at p. 30-31.) These 
claims are belied and unsupported by the fact that Defendants, as Joint Venture 
Partners, had the right and authority to fully participate in the management of the 
Joint Venture. (See Article 4 of the Joint Venture Agreement.) Furthermore, 
Defendants were obligated to continue to operate the business of the Center 
pursuant to the Management Agreement entered into as part of the Joint Venture. 
Plaintiff suggests that this Court must look at the transaction between 
Defendants and IHC as a whole and, that the Court, in construing the documents 
which constitute the transaction, must look to the substance of the documents, 
rather than to their form. (Appellant's Brief at p. 17.) Defendants agree. When 
the transaction between IHC and Defendants is examined as a whole, and the 
substance of the documents rather than their form is considered, it is clear that 
Defendants owned an undivided one-half interest in the equipment and assets of 
the Center that were contributed to the Joint Venture, that Defendants were co-
owners of the Joint Venture after it was formed, with full rights of management, 
and that Defendants continued to hold and exercise operational control over the 
Center after the Joint Venture was formed. From this evidence it is clear that a 
"purchaser" did not assume complete operational control of the business of the 
Center. Rather, operational control of the business of the Center never left the 
Defendants. 
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C. THE CENTER DID NOT CONTINUE IN OPERATION UNDER 
THE SAME NAME AT THE SAME LOCATION. 
Plaintiff argues that a factual dispute exists as to whether the Center 
continued to operate under the same name at the same location after the Joint 
Venture was formed. In support of their position that the Center did not continue 
to operate under the same name at the same location, Defendants filed the 
Affidavit of Gene Oaks. (R. 271-73.) Mr. Oaks Affidavit states: 
2. I was the business office manager of 
[Defendants] at the [Center] from August, 1987 to its 
closing in August of 1991. 
5. After the Defendants and [IHC] entered 
into the IHC Agreement, those parties changed the 
name on the door of the Center, the marquis in the 
lobby and two monument signs located on the building 
exterior at 39th South and 7th East approximately one 
year before the Plaintiffs [sic] filed their lawsuit in 
October, 1991. 
(Id.) 
In support of its position on this issue, Plaintiff relied on the Affidavits of 
Greg Gardner and Doug Toole. Toole's Affidavit at paragraph 10 and Gardner's 
Affidavit at paragraph 7 state: 
After May 24, 1990, the Center itself continued 
to operate at the same location at 670 East 3900 South 
under the name "Salt Lake Sports Medicine Center" 
until after the plaintiff filed this law suit in October of 
1991. 
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(R. 235, 241.) Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of 
Affidavits of Greg Gardner and Doug Toole. (R. 285-88.) With respect to the 
subject paragraphs, Defendants objected on the ground that there was no 
foundation. (Id.) The trial court did not expressly rule on Defendants' Motion to 
Strike. However, in granting summary judgment the trial court must have 
determined that the Motion to Strike was well grounded or that the factual question 
at issue was not material. 
That fact issue, if the Gardner and Toole affidavits are considered, is 
immaterial because Plaintiff did not establish that a purchaser had acquired and 
paid consideration for all of the equipment and assets of the Center and assumed 
complete operational control of the Center. Without a "sale" under paragraph 11, 
the factual dispute set forth above is not material. 
However, and more importantly, Defendants' Motion to Strike preserved 
Defendants' objection to the Gardner and Toole Affidavits, and this Court should 
affirm the trial court's implied grant of Defendants' Motion to Strike. This Court 
can determine whether the affidavits set forth the foundation necessary for the 
paragraphs at issue to be admissible, and should rule that they are deficient. 
Although the affidavits state that they are made on personal knowledge, the 
affidavits are completely silent as to how Gardner and Toole obtained personal 
knowledge of the asserted facts. There is no basis in the affidavits from which this 
Court can determine that Gardner and Toole in fact had personal knowledge of the 
27 
asserted facts. The Court does not know whether they learned of the asserted facts 
by driving to the Center and reading the signs on the door, marquis and building 
or whether they obtained "personal knowledge" because it was told to them by 
someone else, they read it in a letter or heard it on the grapevine. 
It is fundamental that a party must come forward with admissible evidence 
to create a disputed issue of fact on summary judgment. See, Treloggan v. 
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985); and Norton v. Blackhaim 669 P.2d 
857, 859 (Utah 1983). Rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence, states, in pertinent 
part: 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence 
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the 
witness has personal knowledge of the matter. 
In Treloggan, the Supreme Court held that affidavits that "reveal no 
evidentiary facts, but merely reflect the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and 
conclusions" are deficient and do not create a genuine issue of fact. Id. 699 P.2d 
at 748. In this case there was no evidence presented to support a finding that 
Gardner and Toole had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. Accordingly, this 
Court should find that the Gardner and Toole Affidavits were inadmissible as to 
the issue in question, that the Oakes Affidavit stood uncontroverted, and further 
find that there were no material factual issues that precluded the entry of summary 
judgment. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction due to Plaintiffs failure to timely file its Notice of Appeal. In the 
alternative, this Court should affirm the trial court's order granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ * day of February, 1995. 
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P. 
Mark O. Morris 
Paul D. Newman 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(aj x^ppeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court withm 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) F o r c la imant . A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) F o r defending par ty . A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Mot ion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such tacts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively tha t the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits a re unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits m a d e in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(ej Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
